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Abstract: 
Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more 
cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs 
and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with other pairs, where each person 
knows the identity of the partner in their pair, and then compare the pairs’ behavior with the 
behavior of individuals in the same game played against individuals. Pairs contribute 
significantly more than individuals, especially when they are matched with other pairs for the 
entire periods. Possible factors that drove this result are discussed in the paper. 
JEL classification: C91, C92, H41 
Keywords: experiment, cooperation, dilemma, team work, public goods 
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I.  Introduction 
One of the most asked questions in economics is how people can cooperate with others in 
dilemma situations. Experiments in the past several decades have intensively studied people’s 
cooperation behaviors. On the one hand, the literature suggests that some people prefer to 
cooperate in dilemma situations. For instance, some individuals attempt to cooperate even in 
one-shot dilemma games, or in earlier periods of finitely repeated dilemma games when they 
individually make cooperation decisions (e.g., Ledyard 1995, Zelmer 2003, Chaudhuri 2011). 
But on the other hand, it has also shown that we may need some institutions to sustain 
cooperation as cooperation usually gradually declines over time.
2
 Various institutions are proven 
to be effective in encouraging people to cooperate in finitely-repeated dilemma games. Examples 
include costly punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000 and 2002), nonmonetary punishment 
(e.g., Masclet et al. 2003), sorting (e.g., Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2007, Gächter and Thöni 2010) 
and endogenous group formation (e.g., Page, Putterman and Unel 2005, Kamei and Putterman 
forthcoming). However, almost all of these studies on institutions to enhance cooperation are 
conducted by using individuals as the decision-making unit. Cooperation decisions are often 
made by pairs in reality. Examples where a pair of people makes a single decision either to act 
cooperatively or selfishly in dilemma situations are readily available in our everyday life. For 
instance, many decisions couples make at home are made jointly. A couple may jointly decide 
either to clean up after their dog or leave it behind when walking their dog. They may also 
jointly decide to play music loudly at night or keep it at a low volume. In another situation, two 
university friends that always hang out together may decide to speak loudly or keep quiet at a 
library. When eating at a cafeteria, they may jointly decide to return their trays where they are 
supposed to or just leave them on a table. How do people’s joint cooperation decisions − by joint 
cooperation decision we mean a single decision made by a pair of individuals − differ from 
individual cooperation decisions? Does letting people make decisions in pairs help sustain 
cooperation norms in a dilemma situation? Do people’s joint cooperation decisions differ by the 
probability of being matched with the same counterparts again in the future?  
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 One main reason of this decay is that cooperators give up cooperating with others after seeing the defection or free-
riding by their partners (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). 
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This paper experimentally addresses the above research questions by using a finitely-
repeated two-player dilemma game with two kinds of matching protocols: (a) partner matching 
between two pairs and (b) stranger matching within a community.
3
 Both matching protocols are 
prevalent in the real world. Imagine, for example, that two couples are living in a duplex 
property (a house that has separate entrances for two households). Their interactions with each 
other would last for some time. Also, imagine another situation where a pair lives in a house in 
an area in which community events are occasionally held. They would meet with other pairs 
rather randomly when the pair participates in some of the events.  
Action choices of pairs and individuals in repeated dilemma setups can be different, 
considering the large volume of experimental research on team behaviors.
4
 The literature, for 
example, suggests that (a) people choose more materially beneficial options when they make 
decisions with a partner or in a team, (b) teams may exhibit less myopic loss aversion, (c) teams 
may be more likely to overcome coordination failure than individuals, (d) members in a team 
may exhibit some social effects such as shame and a desire to be respected from their team 
members (e.g., Charness and Sutter 2012 for a survey). However, to our knowledge, there is no 
agreement among scholars whether people behave more cooperatively or selfishly when they 
decide on their action choices as a pair or in a team in a non-strategic environment, where each 
decision-making unit does not interact with another one. 
In a non-strategic environment, Cason and Mui (1997) and Luhan et al. (2009) explored 
how teams behaved differently from individuals using a dictator game. While Cason and Mui 
(1997) find that teams behave more pro-socially than individuals, Luhan et al. (2009) find that 
teams behave more selfishly than individuals. The joint decision-making protocols used are 
different between the two studies. In Cason and Mui (2007), “Every team was called to the front 
of the room and excused to the hallway to discuss their decision and fill out the form in private” 
(page 1471). This process diminishes social distance within (and across) team members. By 
contrast, in Luhan et al. (2009), each subject was not informed of their team members’ identities 
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 Each decision-making unit is matched with the same decision-making unit during the entire session in the partner 
matching protocol. By contrast, each decision-making unit is randomly matched with another decision-making unit 
from round to round in the stranger matching protocol. 
4
 In this paper, we use the term “team” (“team decision-making”) to generally express a decision-making unit whose 
size is more than one (decision-making whose unit has more than one subject). By contrast, we use the term “pair” 
(“joint decision-making”) to refer to a decision-making unit whose size is exactly two (decision-making whose unit 
has exactly two subjects).  
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and “the communication within each team was possible exclusively via an electronic chat 
program” (page 30). Luhan et al. (2009) provide a possible reason for the difference in the result 
between Cason and Mui (1997) and Luhan et al. (2009): “The differences between both 
approaches might induce different degrees of social distance (within and across teams), which 
could trigger the different results.”   
More recently, there is some research involving strategic environments, where each agent 
plays against a counterpart. Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) compared two-person pairs and 
individuals by letting the subjects play multiple finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. 
They used a joint decision-making protocol that made the social distance between the subjects 
remained large. That is, the subjects’ identities were kept anonymous and their communication 
was through electronic chat systems similar to Luhan et al. (2009). Kagel and McGee 
(forthcoming) find that in the first super-game (finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game), pairs 
behave more selfishly than individuals, as is consistent with the findings of Luhan et al. (2009).
5
 
But, what happens if people make action choices together as a pair when they know who they 
have in their pairs? This is worth investigating as there are many real-world situations where 
people make joint decisions while knowing their decision-making partners. Most of the decisions 
made at firms and at households are made in teams. When these decisions are made, the 
decision-makers know who their team members are but may not know the teams they are dealing 
with in person. For this reason, we employ a joint decision-making protocol that is closer to 
Cason and Mui (1997) but keep the social distance across pairs anonymous. 
Our experiment is based on a framework of a finitely-repeated, two-player public goods 
game (a continuous version of prisoner’s dilemma game).6 Each group contains two decision-
making units that simultaneously decide allocation amounts using their endowments between 
their private accounts and group account. Our design is set so that it is privately optimal for each 
decision-making unit to contribute nothing to their group account. We design two joint-decision 
treatments and two individual-decision treatments. In the two joint-decision treatments, each 
subject is randomly paired with another subject at the beginning of the experiment; and they 
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 Pairs learned more quickly to cooperate with other pairs from super-game to super-game, however. In the later 
super-games, pairs cooperate significantly more than individual players. 
6
 We chose a finitely-repeated game as the framework of our study. We acknowledge that in some real-world 
interactions people’s interactions can be described as infinitely-repeated interactions, however. We use a finitely-
repeated setup because economic theory provides a clearer prediction when games are played finitely. 
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form a decision-making unit. They are informed of the true identity of their assigned partner. 
Specifically, each subject is informed of the seat number of their partner and they sit next to each 
other. The pairing is fixed during the entire session. Regarding matching across pairs, in one 
treatment, a partner matching protocol is used. In the other treatment, a stranger matching 
protocol is used. Each pair is given an ample time — one minute in each period — to discuss 
their joint allocation amounts, and then jointly decides how much to contribute to their group 
accounts. Before entering the communication stage in each period, subjects are also asked to 
answer hypothetical contribution amounts that they would choose as pairs if they could decide 
pair allocation amounts unilaterally without communicating with their partners (under the 
condition that the two individuals in pairs equally share the resulting pair payoff as in the main 
part of the experiment). We include this elicitation task in order to study (a) how a subject’s 
willingness to contribute changes because of our joint-decision format, which has two aspects: 
one that she has another person in a team and the other that her decision also affects that person’s 
payoff, and (b) how their personal preferences are affected by their partners through 
communication. The two control treatments are designed to be comparable to the corresponding 
joint-decision treatments. In the control treatments, each subject is given an endowment and then 
simultaneously and independently decides contribution amounts to their group accounts, either 
under the partner matching with another individual or under the stranger matching within a 
session. 
Our experiment finds that pairs behave significantly more cooperatively than individuals 
in the control treatments, as is consistent with Cason and Mui (1997). The difference is 
especially large when each pair repeatedly plays the dilemma games with a fixed pair. Under the 
partner matching procedure, most pairs establish long-sustained, highly cooperative relationships 
with their matched pairs until near the known end period. This is in sharp contrast with the 
corresponding individual-decision treatment with the partner matching protocol in which 
contribution amounts quickly decline in the earlier rounds and then stay at a low level until the 
end period.  
An exploration of the subjects’ contribution preferences elicited before they 
communicated with their partners in each period finds two effects that the joint decision-making 
protocol has on the dynamics of people’s cooperation behavior. First, the subjects on average 
have higher contribution amounts in their mind when they have been paired with someone as a 
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decision-making unit, compared with the individuals in the individual-decision treatments. This 
suggests that the joint-decision format in that (i) one has a partner in his pair and (ii) what he 
decides on also affects the partner in his pair may enhance people’s willingness to cooperate. 
Such an effect has also been reported in a non-strategic workplace environment when a team-
based compensation scheme is used (see Babcock et al. 2015). Second, we find evidence that the 
attitudes of a person in a pair can be affected by her partner through communication. Our data 
shows that when each pair is matched with another pair in the entire experiment, both self-
regarding and other-regarding pairs increase their willingness to contribute after communication. 
However, when the stranger matching protocol is used, while other-regarding pairs raise their 
willingness to contribute after communication, the self-regarding pairs decrease their willingness 
to contribute as the more cooperative in pairs reduce their willingness to contribute significantly 
after communication.  
We also find that, the subjects in both joint-decision and individual-decision treatments 
exhibit conditional contribution behaviors. The larger amounts their counterparts contributed in 
the last period, the larger amounts they contribute in the current period. The conditional 
cooperative reaction to their last-period counterparts’ contribution decisions is stronger in the 
joint-decision treatments than in the corresponding individual-decision treatments. This also 
explains the paired subjects’ significantly higher cooperation behavior in our experiment.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes our experimental design. 
Section III briefly provides predictions along with related literature. Section IV reports results, 
and Section V concludes. 
II.  Experimental Design 
The design frame of our experiment is a two-player linear public goods game.
7
 We 
employ the between-subject design.
8
 We set up two sets of two treatments (four treatments in 
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 We use a two-player public goods game, instead of a standard prisoner’s dilemma game, because subjects have 
more flexibility in selecting the degree of cooperation in the public goods game, rather than a binary choice of 
“cooperate” and “defect.” This feature allows us to analyze the subjects’ behavior more precisely. I acknowledge 
that the difference in the game may affect subjects’ decision. For instance, it is known that subjects usually 
contribute around 40% to 60% of their endowments in the initial period of public goods games, depending on 
experimental parameters (e.g., Chaudhuri 2011).  The average cooperation rate in the very first period of finitely-
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games is lower in past studies (e.g., Andoreoni and Miller 1993). 
8
 The subjects are not informed of other treatment conditions. 
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total). Each set consists of a joint-decision treatment and an individual-decision treatment. The 
design of individual-decision treatment is identical to the corresponding joint-decision treatment 
other than the feature that the subjects make decisions alone. The first set of two treatments uses 
a partner matching protocol while the second set uses a stranger matching protocol (see TABLE 
1). In the joint-decision treatments, two individuals act as one decision-making unit, which we 
refer to as a “pair.”  Two two-person pairs (four subjects in total) are grouped and interact with 
each other. We denote this set of two pairs “group” in the joint-decision treatments. In the 
individual-decision treatments, a “group” consists of two individuals that make decisions 
individually.
9
 The number of interactions is 15 in all of the treatments.
10
 
The joint-decision treatments in each set are named the “Joint Decision, Partner” (dubbed 
J-P) treatment and the “Joint Decision, Stranger” (dubbed J-S) treatment. In those two treatments, 
each subject is randomly paired with another subject at the beginning of the experiment. They 
are then informed of the identity of their matched partners.
11
 The pairing is fixed throughout the 
entire experiment. In the J-P treatment, we use a partner matching protocol for group formation. 
That is, each pair is randomly and anonymously matched with another pair at the onset of the 
experiment to form a group; and the grouping becomes fixed throughout the entire experiment. 
By contrast, a stranger matching protocol is used in the J-S treatment: each pair is randomly 
matched with another pair in every period by the computer.  
In the J-P and J-S treatments, each pair is given an endowment of 40 points and makes a 
joint allocation decision between their private account and group account in every period. Only 
non-negative integers are allowed for their contribution amounts. The payoff consequence 
follows the standard linear public goods game (see Eq. (1) below). A pair obtains 1 point for 
each point the pair allocates to their private account; and the pair and their matched pair each 
                                                          
9
 In order to avoid confusion, we separate the meaning of the terms “group size” and “the number of decision-
making units.” The former refers to the number of subjects in a group and the latter refers to the number of 
subject(s) that make decisions either individually or jointly. While both numbers are the same in the treatments 
where subjects make decisions individually, the “group size” is 4 and “the number of decision-making units” is 2 in 
the joint-decision treatments. 
10
 Subjects were clearly informed of the number of periods at the beginning of the experiment.  
11
 In order to ensure that pairs were randomly formed, each subject was asked to draw a slip of paper with a seat 
number before the start of the experiment and sit at the seat with the number indicated on the paper. Two subjects 
that were seated next to each other became a pair. No communication was permitted during this pairing process until 
the joint decision stage described later. 
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obtain 0.8 points for each point the pair allocates to their group account. In short, the payoff of 
pair i in period t  {1, 2, …, 15} is calculated by:  
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 40 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 0.8 ∙ (𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑗,𝑡), (1) 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡{0,1,2,… ,40} is the joint contribution amount of pair i in period t, and pair j is pair 
i’s matched pair in period t. Each member in pair i obtains half of 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 as his or her period t 
payoff. 
The procedure in which each pair decides their joint allocation amounts is as follows: 
subjects in the J-P and J-S treatments are given one minute to freely discuss their strategies and 
decisions with their partners using an electronic chat system in each period. Although their 
partners sit next to them, they are not allowed to communicate verbally and are only permitted to 
communicate with each other via chat windows.
12
 This ensures that the content of 
communication within pairs is their private information. Once the communication stage is over, 
each individual in a pair privately and simultaneously submits an amount they wish to allocate to 
the group account using their computer terminal. If a subject and his partner in the pair submit 
the same allocation amount, then the amount becomes their pair’s joint allocation amount to the 
group account for this period. If the subject and his partner submit different amounts, then one of 
the two amounts will be selected with a probability of 50% by the computer.
13
 Both subjects will 
                                                          
12
 As explained later, the sessions were conducted at an experimental laboratory at the University of Michigan. In 
this laboratory, there are partitions between desks, which made it easy for us to implement this rule. 
13
 This rule was applied to a small number of the pairs in the experiment. In 24 out of 240 (= 16 pairs × 15 periods) 
joint decisions (10.0% of the decisions) in the J-P treatment and in 32 out of 240 joint decisions (13.3% of the 
decisions) in the J-S treatment, two subjects in pairs submitted different amounts after the communication stage. A 
closer look at the subjects’ dialogues indicate that only nine cases (3.8% of the joint decisions) in the J-P treatment 
and four cases (1.7% of the joint decisions) in the J-S treatment were due to clear disagreements. The remaining 
cases where different amounts were submitted were due to the following three reasons. First, some pairs 
intentionally submitted different amounts or did not make any efforts in agreeing a joint allocation amount although 
they communicated with each other. An example of this case is by Pair 10 in the J-P treatment in period 9:  
Subject 39: ...so no to the 20? 
Subject 38: i'm thinking we can put different amouts and just let the computer decide? 
Subject 39: ohhhh, ok. thats fine.  
Subject 39: i'll put 20 each time 
Subject 38: ill do 0 
Second, some pairs agreed on what they would jointly allocated, but two members submitted different amounts. An 
example of this case is the decision of Pair 22 in the J-S treatment in period 1; they agreed to jointly contribute 40 
points in chats. However one of them typed 39 while the other typed 40. Lastly, some pairs did not make enough 
communications as to what specific amounts to allocate. For example, the two members of Pair 22 in the J-S 
treatment submitted different amounts for the most of the periods after period 1, while chatting about unrelated 
topics.  All dialogues are available on online sources.  
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be informed of what amount their pair partners submitted before being informed of their 
interaction outcome with the other pair.   
In the J-P and J-S treatments, we elicit hypothetical contribution amounts the subjects 
prefer to make as pairs before entering the communication stage in each period. Specifically, we 
ask them what amount they would choose if they could decide their pair’s allocation amounts 
unilaterally based on the 40 points without communicating with their partners (the payoff would 
still be split in half based on Eq. (1)). This elicitation task is not incentivized in order to avoid 
making this elicitation task salient.
14
  
We set up an individual-decision treatment to correspond to each of the J-P and J-S 
treatments. In the “Individual Decisions, Partner” treatment (dubbed I-P) and the “Individual 
Decisions, Stranger” treatment (dubbed I-S), subjects play two-person public goods games 15 
rounds. Each subject is given an endowment of 40 points in each period, as is each pair in the J-P 
and J-S treatments. Two subjects in each group then simultaneously and independently decide 
contribution amounts to their group account. Their allocation amounts must be integers between 
0 and 40. To make the I-P (I-S) treatment parallel to the J-P (J-S) treatment, the payoff 
consequence of each subject’s decision is set as half of a pair’s payoff in the joint-decision 
treatment.
15
 That is, subject k obtains 0.5 points for each point she allocates to her private 
account; and she and her partner each obtain 0.4 points for each point she allocates to her group 
account. Note that the marginal per-capita return (MPCR) is 0.8 in both the joint-decision and 
individual-decision treatments. In short, the payoff of subject k in period t  {1, 2, …, 15} is 
expressed by: 
 𝜋𝑘,𝑡 = 0.5 ∙ [(40 − 𝑐𝑘,𝑡) + 0.8 ∙ (𝑐𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑙,𝑡)] 
 = 0.5 ∙ (40 − 𝑐𝑘,𝑡) + 0.4 ∙ (𝑐𝑘,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑙,𝑡),  (2) 
where 𝑐𝑘,𝑡{0,1,2, … ,40} is the contribution amount of subject k in period t, and subject l is 
subject k’s matched individual in period t. The I-P and I-S treatments use the partner matching 
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 In addition, this questionnaire is included only on the subjects’ computer screen. At the onset of the experiment, 
they are told that some additional questions related to the experiment may be asked while the experiment is in 
progress. 
15
 Making per-subject payoff consequences the same between individuals and pairs is usually used in related studies, 
including Cason and Mui (1997) and Luhan et al. (2009). 
10 
 
protocol and the stranger matching protocol, respectively. The matching process is identical to 
the corresponding joint-decision treatments explained above. As in the joint-decision treatments, 
the subjects are informed of the outcome of their interactions at the end of each period. 
 Finally, at the end of the experiment, all subjects are asked their reasoning behind their 
allocation decisions. 
III. Predictions and Behavioral Considerations 
 Predictions based on standard theory for the four treatments are straightforward. 
Contributing zero points to their group account is a strictly dominant strategy for each subject. 
Thus, mutual full free riding is a unique Nash Equilibrium in each treatment (Ck,t = 0 for all k and 
t for the joint-decision treatments; cj,t = 0 for all j and t for the individual-decision treatments).  
 As mentioned in Section I, however, established evidence from past finitely-repeated 
dilemma game experiments suggests that some subjects may attempt to cooperate in earlier 
periods. But the cooperation rate will most likely keep declining over the periods when subjects 
individually make allocation decisions in our environment.
16
 This dynamic can be rationalized if 
we assume that some subjects have other-regarding preferences (see Sobel (2005) for a survey) 
or that they at least believe that some subjects do so. One can presume that the same behavior 
can be seen when subjects make decisions jointly under the assumption that pairs behave the 
same way as individuals do. 
 However, we would expect a higher level of cooperation with our joint decision-making 
protocol because of possible social effects. In a study where they conducted two field 
experiments to investigate the effects of having peers in non-strategic environments, Babcock et 
al. (2015) confirm that team-based compensation system make people work harder. They argue 
that this phenomenon was caused by the social effects that they defined as “those that are related 
in a direct way to the utility an individual derives from interacting with others, including but not 
limited to effects from altruism, guilt, shame, embarrassment, commitment devices, fear of social 
punishment, or a desire to be liked or respected.” As the joint decision-making format in our 
study renders one’s decision inevitably relevant to her pair partner’s payoff, the same or similar 
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 More cooperation-oriented subjects are quickly discouraged if they see others free ride (e.g., Fischbacher and 
Gächter 2010). 
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social effects can be expected in a strategic environment like ours. Further, each person has full 
knowledge on the identity of their pair partner in our design. This reduces the social distance 
within pairs, which presumably increases the impact of social effects. 
 The significance of the social effects can be examined by comparing (a) the subjects’ 
hypothetical pair contribution amounts elicited prior to communicating with their partners in the 
joint-decision treatments with (b) the subjects’ individual contribution amounts in the 
corresponding individual-decision treatments. The subjects’ pre-communication willingness to 
contribute in the J-P and J-S treatments can be inflated even from period 1 if playing as a pair has 
effects on their preferences. 
QUESTION 1: Are the average hypothetical contribution amounts elicited before the discussion 
with partners in the J-P (J-S) treatment higher than the average contributions by individuals in 
the I-P (I-S) treatment? 
 Apart from the social effects discussed above, there is another possible reason that 
people’s decisions made jointly as a pair can be different from those made individually in 
repeated dilemma situations. It is known that people in teams tend to have deeper insights and 
better understanding of the nature of interactions, which enables them to choose more materially 
beneficial options, in comparison to when they make decisions alone (see Charness and Sutter 
for a survey).
17
 In this sense, there are two possible opposing predictions regarding how making 
decisions jointly affects people’s behavior in our strategic context. On the one hand, pairs may 
behave more in line with what standard theory predicts if joint decision-making strengthens their 
game theoretic reasoning. For instance, Kocher and Sutter (2005) find that teams learn to submit 
lower numbers in beauty-contest games more quickly than individuals do when they repeat the 
games.
18,19
 If something similar happens in our environment, cooperation will decline more 
quickly in the J-P (J-S) treatment than in the I-P (I-S) treatment. One the other hand, letting 
subjects make decisions jointly may contribute to sustaining cooperation in repeated dilemma 
situations. First, if pairs believe that not all subjects are selfish, then they may consider that free-
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 Note that the number of subjects in a team is more than two in the majority of previous research. We acknowledge 
that some implications found in previous studies may not extend to our environment.  
18
 The size of a decision-making unit is three, and the number of decision-making units in a group is five in Kocher 
and Sutter unlike our setup. 
19
 Also see Cooper and Kagel (2006). They find that teams play more strategically than individuals in signaling 
game experiments. 
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riding in earlier periods is not the best strategy if they want to maximize their total payoff across 
the 15 periods, as is the logic by Kreps et al. (1982).
20
 Pairs may, understanding the features of 
the games more deeply, expect that if they discourage their matched pairs by free-riding, it 
would deteriorate their relationships with their matched pairs, by which they may end up 
obtaining lower payoffs as a group in the rest of the interactions. Each pair would be materially 
better off if they could successfully build a trustful relationship and encourage their matched 
pair(s) to keep cooperating with them.
21
 Thus, pairs in the joint-decision treatments might value 
building such trustful relationships more highly compared with a gain from one-time defection.
22
 
As a result, they might attempt to reciprocate cooperation behavior of their matched pairs more 
strongly than individuals do. Note, however, that they may attempt to severely milk their 
established relationships with their matched pairs near the end period if they are primarily 
strategically motivated. Second, some studies have shown that teams tend to exhibit less myopic 
loss aversion than individuals in a risky situation (e.g., Sutter, 2007). In our environment, a pair 
incurs a loss if the pair decides to cooperate but their matched pair(s) does not reciprocate the 
intention. However, as in the past studies, pairs may be more forward-looking and be more 
willing than individuals to take risks in investing in encouraging their matched pairs to cooperate 
by sending signals to them via their own high contributions. These considerations lead to the 
following specific question in our study: 
QUESTION 2: Are the pairs’ contributions more sustained in the J-P (J-S) treatment than the 
individuals’ contributions in the I-P (I-S) treatment? 
 If QUESTION 2 has an affirmative answer, then we could furthermore expect that 
building a trustful relationship would be easier for pairs in the treatment with the partner 
matching protocol as each pair repeatedly interacts with the same pair in every round. In the J-S 
treatment, unlike the J-P treatment, a pair meets with a specific pair in two consecutive periods 
with a probability of 14.3% (= 1/7  1/7  100%  7 potential pairs). The difference in the re-
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 Joint or team decision-making can be helpful in overcoming coordination failure among subjects. For example, 
Feri et al. (2010) find that groups are more likely to choose mutually beneficial, Pareto-efficient equilibrium among 
multiple equilibria when playing weakest-link games. 
21
 A pair in the J-P and J-S treatments obtains 40 points if the pair and their matched pair both contribute 0 points to 
their group account. By contrast, they obtain 64 points if they and their matched pair both contribute 40 points to the 
group account. (The pair profit is divided by half between two individuals in a pair.) 
22
 Gillet et al. (2009), using three teams with a team size of three in each interaction unit, find that teams make 
decisions in a less myopic manner than individuals in repeated common pool resource problems when teams make 
joint decision via unanimity rule. 
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matching probability could impact the timing of the subjects’ end-game defection. In the J-S 
treatment, even if a pair exploits their already-established trustful relationship within a 
community by defecting in some later period, the probability that they will meet with that pair 
again in the rest of the periods is small. This means that they have higher incentives to defect 
than pairs in the J-P treatment. This consideration leads to our third specific question: 
QUESTION 3: Is cooperation more sustained in the J-P treatment than in the J-S treatment? 
  Lastly, the opportunity to make a joint decision may also affect the subjects’ cooperative 
attitudes due to what psychologists call group polarization in our strategic environment, as is 
shown in non-strategic environments (e.g., Cason and Mui, 1997; Luhan et al. 2009). Group 
polarization refers to the situation in which “after deliberation, people are likely to move toward 
a more extreme point in the direction to which the group members were originally inclined” 
(page 60, Sunstein 2007).
23
 Cason and Mui (1997) discussed the two dominant theories, the 
Persuasive Argument Theory (PAT) and the Social Comparison Theory (SCT), and tested these 
theories by using team-based dictator games. The PAT states that team decision-making process 
is influenced by the persuasiveness of arguments. Accordingly, it predicts that initially self-
regarding pairs become more self-regarding; and likewise, initially other-regarding pairs become 
more other-regarding because individuals in pairs would find arguments that support their 
original views more convincing during the course of their discussion. By contrast, the SCT states 
that people tend to gather more information as to what a socially desirable action is when 
interacting with others and behave in a socially desirable manner. Accordingly, it predicts that all 
pairs, whether self-regarding or other-regarding, become more other-regarding after they 
communicate with pair partners (See Cason and Mui 1997 for the detail). The subjects’ behavior 
in the team dictator game in their study was more consistent with the SCT.
24
  
In this paper, we examine which theory better explains our data by using a method 
similar to the one employed by Cason and Mui (1997) as group polarization may affect how 
cooperation evolve in the experiment. We classify a pair as a self-regarding pair if the average of 
                                                          
23
 See also Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969). They let subjects discuss some topics with others and had them 
unanimously give opinion or judgment ratings for each item. They find that “the polarization effect will be greater 
when the group must commit itself to a given position, than when it is asked to express an “objective” judgment” 
(on page 134). Recall that each pair in our joint-decision treatments must commit a single allocation amount in a 
given period. 
24
 In Luhan et al. (2009), teams made more selfish choices as joint decisions were influenced by the most selfish 
players in teams. 
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their hypothetical pre-communication contributions across all periods 
(𝐶?̅?𝑎𝑖𝑟
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 =
1
30
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜2
𝑖=1
15
𝑡=1 , where i =1, 2 refers to each of the two persons in a pair) is less 
than the session average of 𝐶?̅?𝑎𝑖𝑟
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜
. Likewise, we classify a pair as an other-regarding pair if 
𝐶?̅?𝑎𝑖𝑟
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜
 is greater than the session average of it. The SCT predicts that the pairs’ contribution 
amounts made jointly after communication will be greater than the pre-communication 
willingness to contribute, both for the self-regarding and other-regarding pairs. The PAT predicts 
that the pairs’ contribution amounts made jointly after communication are greater (smaller) than 
their pre-communication hypothetical contribution amounts for the other-regarding pairs (the 
self-regarding pairs).  
IV. Results 
 Two sessions per treatment were conducted at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. 
A total of 96 subjects participated in the experiment.
25
 No subject participated in more than one 
session. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). All instructions were 
neutrally framed.
26
 Subjects were asked to answer a number of control questions to confirm their 
understanding of the experiment. 
A. Average Contribution by Treatment 
 We first compare the average contributions between the J-P (J-S) and I-P (I-S) treatments 
(FIGURE 1).
27
 First, both the levels and the trends of average contributions substantially differ 
between the individual-decision and joint-decision treatments under the partner matching 
protocol. The average contributions in the J-P treatment begin at around 70% of the endowment, 
                                                          
25
 Solicitation messages were sent via ORSEE (Online Recruitment System For Economic Experiments), which was 
developed by Greiner (2003), to all eligible potential subjects. Subjects then voluntary signed up for the experiment. 
Most participants were undergraduate students at the University of Michigan. The average payoff (except the 
participation payment) was $14.35 with a standard deviation of $2.05. The number of female subjects was 57 
(59%). The sessions in the I-S and I-P treatments lasted a little over 30 minutes, and the sessions in the J-P and J-S 
treatments lasted around 80 minutes (including payment to the subjects). As explained in Section 4.D, another 34 
subjects participated in additional treatments. The recruiting procedure in the additional treatments was exactly the 
same as that in the original treatments. 
26
 For example, terms having neutral connotation, such as “group account” and “allocate,” instead of “public account” 
and “contribute,” were used. See Appendix A for the instructions of the J-P treatment.  
27
 Average payoffs in the joint-decision (individual-decision) treatments are simply linear transformations of average 
contributions based on Equation (1) (Equation (2)). 
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increase gradually, and then remain at a level of around 80% of the endowment until period 13. 
As usual in the standard public goods or prisoner’s dilemma game experiments, strong end game 
defection is seen in the J-P treatment (Andreoni 1988, Andreoni and Miller 1993). This 
observation on the end-game effect suggests that the high cooperation level in the J-P treatment 
partially stems from the subjects’ strategic motives. By sharp contrast, in the I-P treatment, the 
average contributions decline steadily over the periods. The differences in the average 
contribution between the J-P and I-P treatments are significant in all periods except periods 1, 2 
and 15 – the end period (Appendix TABLE B.1).28 A regression analysis, shown in TABLE 2, 
confirms that the overall declining trend of contribution amounts in the I-P treatment is 
significant but it is not in the J-P treatment. In this analysis, we use a Tobit model as the right- 
and left-censored observations (i.e., 40 and 0) are not negligible as usual in public goods game 
experiments. We control for individual effects by including random effects. 
RESULT 1: Average contributions are sustained at a high level in the J-P treatment. By contrast, 
they are in a significantly decreasing trend in the I-P treatment.  
 Second, the levels of average contributions are substantially different between the 
individual-decision and joint-decision treatments under the stranger matching protocol as well 
(Panel (b) of FIGURE 1). A regression analysis confirms that the overall difference in the 
contribution level between the two treatments is statistically significant (columns (3) and (4) of 
TABLE 2). However, average contributions are in declining trends over the periods in both the J-
S and I-S treatments. Consequently, the average contributions are often significantly higher in 
the J-S treatment than in the I-S treatment in the first eight periods, but not in later periods 
(Appendix TABLE B.1).  
RESULT 2: Average contributions are often significantly higher in the J-S treatment than in the 
I-S treatment in the first eight periods in the experiment. They are in significantly decreasing 
trends in both the J-S and I-S treatments. 
                                                          
28
 Also see the coefficient estimates of variable (i) in columns (1) and (2) of TABLE 2. 
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B. Hypothetical Contributions in the Joint-Decision Treatments and Potential Driving Forces 
behind the Pairs’ Inflated Contributions 
 Potential driving forces behind the difference in the subjects’ contribution behavior 
between the J-P (J-S) and I-P (I-S) treatments can be explored by using the hypothetical 
contribution amounts elicited before the communication stage in the joint-decision treatments. 
As outlined in Section III, we first explore potential effects of making a single decision as a pair 
in the joint-decision treatments by comparing (i) period 1 hypothetical contribution amounts in 
the J-P (J-S) treatment with (ii) period 1 individual contribution amounts in the I-P (I-S) 
treatment. The period 1 hypothetical contribution amounts are the subjects’ willingness to 
cooperate as pairs before entering the first communication stage.
29
 Our data indicates that the 
average period 1 hypothetical contribution amounts are not statistically different between the two 
joint-decision treatments (28.2 points in the J-P treatment versus 27.2 points in the J-S treatment). 
But, the average hypothetical contributions in the J-P and J-S treatments are both higher than the 
average contributions in the I-P and I-S treatments, respectively, although the difference is 
statistically significant only between the J-S and I-S treatments (see Appendix TABLE B.1). 
This suggests that the fact that two persons act as a pair in the joint-decision treatments may 
enhance their willingness to contribute to their group accounts. 
RESULT 3: The average period 1 pre-communication hypothetical contribution in the J-P (J-S) 
treatment is higher (significantly higher) than the average period 1 contribution in the I-P (I-S) 
treatment. 
 A period-by-period exploration of the average pre-communication contribution 
preferences shows that the trends are similar to those of the average realized joint contribution 
amounts in each of the J-P and J-S treatments (FIGURE 1) —the subjects’ pre-communication 
willingness to contribute stays at a high level in each of the two joint-decision treatments.
30
 A 
                                                          
29
 We can also measure this effect by comparing these two kinds of decisions in periods 2 to 15. But, pre-
communication hypothetical contribution amounts elicited in periods 2 to 15 may be affected by their partners’ 
preferences the subjects learned through communication in the past periods. Test results for such comparisons in 
each of periods 2 to 15 are, nevertheless, reported in Appendix TABLE B.1. 
30
 The average hypothetical contributions in the J-P treatment are significantly higher than the average contributions 
in the I-P treatment in most periods, except the very early periods and near the end period. The average hypothetical 
contributions in the J-S treatment are often significantly higher than the average contributions in the I-S treatment 
until period 8. See Appendix TABLE B.1 for the details. 
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potential factor that helped sustain the subjects’ willingness to cooperate is the effects of 
communication, especially group polarization, considering that the social distance within pairs is 
small in our joint decision-making system (Cason and Mui 1997). Our data, especially the J-P 
treatment, seem to be more consistent with the SCT, as in Cason and Mui (1997), given that the 
average realized joint contribution amounts are slightly higher than the average hypothetical 
contributions in most periods in that treatment. This could mean that especially those with the 
lower willingness to contribute in pairs may have been more affected by their partners, including 
the self-regarding pairs.  
 As discussed in Section III, we now investigate whether the SCT or the PAT better fits 
our data. Out of 16 pairs in the J-P treatment, six pairs are classified as the self-regarding pairs 
and ten pairs are classified as the other-regarding pairs. Our raw data appears to suggest that the 
SCT better explains the J-P treatment data. The percentages of periods in which the self-
regarding pairs on average increased and decreased the joint contribution amounts from the 
average pre-communication hypothetical contribution amounts of the two individuals in a pair 
are 35.6% and 18.9%, respectively. The other-regarding pairs contributed more than the average 
pre-communication contribution amounts in 14.0% of the total periods, and they contributed less 
for 8.0% of the total periods. The average shifts in contributions of pairs before and after 
communication are 3.31 points and 1.31 points, both of which are positive, for the self-regarding 
and other-regarding pairs, respectively. These upward shifts in the level of contributions appear 
to be consistent with the Social Comparison Theory. By contrast, the impact of communication 
in the J-S treatment appears to be different from the J-P treatment. Out of the 16 pairs in the J-S 
treatment, 8 pairs are classified as the self-regarding pairs and the other 8 pairs are classified as 
the other-regarding pairs. While we see an increase in the contribution amounts allocated by the 
self-regarding pairs from the average pre-communication hypothetical contribution amounts in 
14.2% of the total periods, they were less in 20.8% of the total periods. The other-regarding pairs 
contributed more than their average pre-communication contribution amounts in 28.3% of the 
total periods and they contributed less in 24.2% of the total periods.  The average shifts in 
contributions are small: -.21 points and .083 points for the self-regarding and other-regarding 
pairs, respectively.
31
  
                                                          
31
 See Appendix TABLE B.2. 
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In order to investigate how each individual shifts their willingness to contribute through 
the communication stage as well as whether the pairs’ shifts in their contributions through 
communication are significant, we conduct a regression analysis in which the dependent variable 
is the contribution amount that subject i submits after the communication stage in period t 
(which we denote as 𝐶𝑖,𝑡) minus the hypothetical contribution amount that subject i submitted 
before communicating with her partner in that period (which we denote as 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜
), for each of 
the self-regarding and other-regarding pairs. Independent variables include (a) the positive 
deviation of hypothetical contributions in period t (= 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 , 0}) and (b) the 
negative deviation of hypothetical contributions in period t (= 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 , 0}). A 
linear regression model is used as the left or right-censored observations are very few in this 
specification.
32
 As shown in TABLE 3, our data shows that, regardless of whether a pair is self-
regarding or other-regarding, the subjects who had more selfish preferences than their pair 
partners (those who input smaller hypothetical contribution amounts than their pair partners) 
significantly raise their willingness to contribute after communication (see the coefficient 
estimates of variable (a)). But at the same time, the pair partners who have more pro-social 
preferences than their partners reduce their willingness to contribute after communication (see 
the coefficient estimates of variable (b)). The mean reverting phenomenon might mean that the 
subjects generally do not hold firm attitudes. For example, Sunstein (2007) argues that: “if most 
of the members do not have entirely fixed positions, there is likely to be real movement toward 
the middle” (page 82). Nevertheless, the relative strength between the former effect on the less 
cooperative and the latter effect on the more cooperative is different between the J-P and J-S 
treatments, and its overall patterns are contrasted between the two treatments. On the one hand, 
for each of the self-regarding and other-regarding pairs, the former positive effect on the less 
cooperative is larger than the latter negative effect in the J-P treatment (it is significantly larger 
for the other-regarding pairs in that treatment), which leads to a significant upward shift in the 
cooperative attitudes of pairs. This pattern in the J-P treatment is more consistent with the SCT 
than the PAT and it could have helped sustain mutual cooperation within their groups. By 
contrast, in the J-S treatment, the latter negative effect is significantly larger than the former 
                                                          
32
 The numbers of left(right)-censored observations (i.e., -40 and 40) of 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜
 are only 5(22) and 2(3) for the 
J-P and J-S treatments, respectively. 
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positive effect at the 10% level for the self-regarding pairs, which leads to a downward shift in 
the self-regarding pairs’ contribution. The former positive effect is, however, larger (although 
insignificantly) than the latter negative effect for the other-regarding pairs, which leads to an 
upward shift in the pair contribution amounts. This pattern in the J-S treatment is more consistent 
with the PAT, rather than the SCT, and this would be damaging to the sustenance of cooperation 
norms due to the self-regarding pairs’ more selfish action choices after communication. This 
result seems to suggest that how group polarization operates may depend on matching protocols 
in a strategic environment. The difference in the pattern of group polarization between the J-P 
and J-S treatments may be the cause for the difference in the trend of cooperation summarized in 
RESULTs 1 and 2 between the two treatments. 
RESULT 4: The results from the J-P treatment is more consistent with the Social Comparison 
Theory, rather than the Persuasive Argument Theory, as is the case in Cason and Mui (1997). By 
contrast, in the J-S treatment, the pairs’ shifts in contributions are more consistent with the 
Persuasive Argument Theory. 
C. Reciprocation to Counterparts’ Last-Period Cooperative Actions 
 Another possible factor that may account for the high contributions with the joint 
decision-making system is that the pairs in the joint-decision treatments, especially in the J-P 
treatment, reciprocate their matched pairs’ willingness to cooperate more strongly. Suppressing 
their temptation to defect and responding positively to their counterparts’ intentions to cooperate 
could be a key for people to build trustful relationships with their matched counterparts and to 
obtain potentially better material outcomes. 
 In order to investigate the degree of the pairs’ (individuals’) reciprocation for cooperation 
behavior by their matched pairs (individuals), we perform a regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is joint or individual contribution amounts in period t ∈ {2, 3, …, 15}. 
Independent variables include their period t – 1 matched counterparts’ contribution amounts in 
period t – 1. We use a Tobit model as a non-negligible fraction of the subjects contributed 0 or 
40, while we control for individual effects by including random effects. As shown in TABLE 4, 
regardless of the matching protocols, both pairs and individuals exhibit statistically significant 
conditional contribution behavior, as is shown in many related studies (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 
20 
 
2001).
33
 However, the level of the conditional willingness to contribute differs by the decision 
process. That is, the pairs in the J-P (J-S) treatment exhibit significantly (weakly significantly) 
stronger conditional willingness to contribute than the individuals in the I-P (I-S) treatment. This 
result suggests that the pairs’ stronger conditional willingness to cooperate may have helped 
them establish cooperative relationships with their matched pairs in the joint-decision 
treatments.
34
  
RESULT 5: The conditional willingness to contribute in the J-P (J-S) treatment is significantly 
(weakly significantly) stronger than that in the I-P (I-S) treatment. 
D. Comparing the Effectiveness of the Joint Decision-Making System with that of an Informal 
Punishment Institution 
One may wonder how the effectiveness of our joint decision-making system compares to 
that of other institutions that may sustain cooperation in dilemma situations. To explore this 
question, we additionally conducted two treatments, each of which was exactly identical to the I-
P and I-S treatments except that it had a standard informal punishment stage after the individual 
contribution stage (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002).
35
 We refer to the two additional 
treatments as the “I-P-Punishment” treatment and the “I-S-Punishment” treatment. As in the I-P 
and I-S treatments, the payoff consequence of a subject’s decision in the I-P-Punishment (I-S-
Punishment) treatment was set as half of the J-P (J-S) treatment. That is, in the punishment 
treatments, the payoff of subject i in period t was calculated as:  
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 0.5 ∙ [𝑚𝑎𝑥{(40 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡) + 0.8 ∙ ∑ 𝑐𝑙,𝑡
2
𝑙=1 − 3𝑝𝑗→𝑖,𝑡, 0} − 𝑝𝑖→𝑗,𝑡]. 
                                                          
33
 The subjects’ responses to a post-experiment, open-ended question provide additional evidence on the subjects’  
conditional contribution behavior and their reputation building motives. This question reads: “On what basis did you 
make allocation decisions?” Many subjects in each treatment gave either conditional behavior or building trustful 
relationships with the other pairs as important factors to obtain a higher total payoff. We acknowledge, however, 
that these responses could have been contaminated by their experiences in the experiment and thus can be used for 
suggestive evidence only. The details are omitted to conserve space. See online Appendix C for all subjects’ 
responses. 
34
 The motives behind RESULTs 4 and 5 are mixed between strategic ones (e.g., pairs behave cooperatively to 
obtain higher material payoffs) and non-strategic ones (e.g., pairs behave cooperatively because they feel a moral 
obligation to do so), as evidenced by the strong end-game defection in the J-P treatment (FIGURE 1). 
35
 Two sessions per each additional treatment were conducted at the University of Michigan. One session of the I-P-
Punishment treatment had 8 subjects and the other had 10 subjects. Each session in the I-S-Punishment treatment 
had eight subjects as in the I-S treatment. 
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= 𝑚𝑎𝑥{0.5 ∙ (40 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡) + 0.4 ∙ ∑ 𝑐𝑙,𝑡
2
𝑙=1 − 1.5𝑝𝑗→𝑖,𝑡, 0} − .5𝑝𝑖→𝑗,𝑡. 
Here, j is the period t matched counterpart of subject i, and 𝑝𝑗→𝑖,𝑡 is the punishment points given 
from subject j to subject i in period t.  In other words, in the informal punishment stage, for each 
punishment point assigned by a subject, 1.5 points were deducted from the punished and 0.5 
points were deducted from the punisher. See Appendix D for the instructions of the I-P-
Punishment treatment for reference.   
Our data shows that neither the average contributions nor the average payoffs are 
significantly different between the J-P and I-P-Punishment treatments.
36
 In addition, while the 
average contributions are almost identical between the J-S and I-S-Punishment treatment, the 
average payoff in the J-S treatment is higher, although insignificantly, than that in the I-S-
Punishment treatment.
37
 This additional data suggests a high potential of joint decision-making 
in deterring people’s opportunistic behavior in dilemma situations when the social distance 
within pairs is small. 
RESULT 6: The average contribution in the J-P treatment (J-S treatment) is not significantly 
different from that in the I-P-Punishment treatment (I-S-Punishment treatment). 
E. A Comparison against Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) and Some Discussions 
 In order for a group not to be trapped by the standard free-riding dynamics, establishing a 
mutually cooperative relationship in earlier periods is essential (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter 
2010). Successful initiations of mutually cooperative relationships were well observed in the 
earlier periods in the J-P treatment (RESULTs 1 and 3). The subjects’ behavior in the J-P 
treatment is different from the standard free-riding dynamics or from the ones in the first super-
                                                          
36
 The average contributions are 30.8 points and 31.8 points in the J-P and I-P-Punishment treatments, respectively. 
The difference in the average contribution is not significant according to a random-effect Tobit regression (p-value 
= .724, two-sided); here, a Tobit model was used as the number of left/right-censored observations are not negligible. 
The average payoffs are 29.2 points and 29.4 points in the J-P and I-P-Punishment treatments, respectively. The 
difference in the average payoff is also not significant according to a random effect linear regression (p-value = .449, 
two-sided). See Appendix E for period-by-period comparisons using Mann-Whitney tests. 
37
 The average contributions are 21.3 points and 21.4 points in the J-S and I-S-Punishment treatments, respectively. 
The difference in the average contribution is not significant according to a random-effect Tobit regression (p-value 
= .724, two-sided). The average payoffs are 26.4 points and 24.5 points in the J-S and I-S-Punishment treatments, 
respectively. The difference in the average payoff is also not significant according to a random effect linear 
regression (p-value = .449, two-side). See Appendix E for period-by-period comparisons using Mann-Whitney tests. 
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game in Kagel and McGee (forthcoming), where each subject was anonymously paired with 
another subject at the onset of the experiment and the pairing stayed fixed over the entire 
experiment. How can we explain the difference in the cooperation dynamics between our study 
and Kagel and McGee (forthcoming)? As mentioned earlier, one important difference between 
our study and Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) is the social distance within pairs. To investigate 
how the difference in social distance between the two studies may affect the subjects’ reasoning, 
we analyze pair dialogues in the J-P treatment, using the same cording categories adopted by 
Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) –TABLE 5 of their paper, and compare against them.38 Since 
our paper uses a public goods game, rather than a prisoner’s dilemma game, we define that 
contributing more than half of the endowment (i.e., 20 points) as “cooperate” and assign codes 
from C1 to C5, dependent on the contents of the conversations. Contributing less than or equal to 
half of the endowment is treated as “defect” and codes from D1 to D6 are assigned to them. 
More than one code is assigned if relevant.
39
 
In the J-P treatment, ten out of 16 pairs (62.5% of the pairs) contributed more than 20 
points to their group account in period 1.  All these 10 pairs were coded either C1 (“If we 
cooperate other team might/will cooperate”) or C3 (“It’s in our best interest to cooperate without 
discussion of the logic behind cooperating”) in that period, whose ratio is significantly higher 
than the corresponding ratio (70.6%) in period 1 of Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) at the 10% 
level (p-value = .0574, two-tailed two-sample test of proportions). As for the six pairs that 
                                                          
38
 This comparison is not perfect as a number of important design pieces are different between the two studies. For 
example, our paper uses a public good game but Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) uses a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
The subjects in the J-P treatment in our study played only one finitely-repeated public goods game while the 
subjects in Kagel and McGee (forthcoming) played multiple finitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. The 
duration of chats is one minute per period in our study, but it was three minutes in each of the first two periods and 
1.5 minutes after period 2 in Kagel and McGee (forthcoming). Therefore, I acknowledge that these comparisons can 
be treated as suggestive evidence only as we cannot rule out the possibility that the difference in the subjects’ 
behavior came from the difference in the experimental design. 
39
 The analysis in this subsection is based on the author’s cording results. Codes were not assigned if there were no 
codes that were appropriate for the subjects’ dialogues. We acknowledge that although the method to code dialogues 
is a novel and useful way to analyze data, subjective judgement is involved; and thus, analyses provided in this 
subsection may need to be treated as suggestive evidence. In addition to the author’s coding, a graduate student at 
Bowling Green State University also independently assigned codes for each chat. In 58 periods out of the 240 
periods’ data (16 pairs  15 periods), the codes assigned by the graduate student did not completely coincide with 
the author’s assigned codes.  Note that in Kagel and McGee, two independent coders assigned codes and likewise in 
around 24% of the periods the two coders assigned different codes. However, the general distribution of codes was 
similar between the author and the graduate student. The author assigned C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 
and D6 for 96, 7, 19, 28, 2, 13, 14, 14, 18, 2 and 5 periods, respectively, whereas the graduate student assigned C1, 
C2, C3, C4, C5, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5 and D6 for 97, 1, 16, 21, 1, 12, 12, 1, 8, 0 and 2 periods, respectively. The 
cording results by the author and the graduate student can be found in the online data files along with the chat data. 
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contributed less than or equal to 20 points to their group account in period 1, no pair was coded 
D1 (“It’s the safest choice”), which would presumably involve discussing some selfish motives, 
in that round. The ratio of being coded D1 (0.0%) is significantly lower than the corresponding 
ratio (91.7%) in Kagel and McGee at the 1% level (p-value = .000, two-tailed two-sample test of 
proportions). Instead, two out of the six defecting pairs were corded D3 (“Defecting but planning 
to cooperate if other does so.”), which is more included towards cooperation. For example, the 
following dialogue of pair 11 is classified as D3:  
Subject 41: I think we should start with a small amount like 10 points 
Subject 41: and see how much the other pair puts in before we put in a bigger amount 
Subject 42: Okay 
In addition, three defecting pairs was coded D4 (“It’s in our best interest – defection without any 
logic behind the doing so”). For example, the dialogues of pair 16 are classified D4: 
Subject51: let's add 20 to gropu 
Subject50: how much you think we should put im 
Subject50: i added 20 too 
Subject50: yea 
These closer looks at the dialogues imply that our subjects seem to be more cooperation-
oriented and be reluctant to talk selfish intentions, compared with the subjects in Kagel and 
McGee (forthcoming). This seems to suggest that the closer social distance in our joint decision-
making protocol may have stimulated their pro-social attitudes. This is similar to the earlier 
quantitative finding summarized in RESULT 4. 
Since the cooperation rate in the very first period was higher in our study than in Kagel 
and McGee (forthcoming), the chance that those who chose “defect” met with those who chose 
“cooperate” in earlier periods of the experiment was higher in our study (see FIGURE 1 in our 
paper and FIGURE 2 of Kagel and McGee (forthcoming)).
40
 In fact, all of the defecting pairs 
were matched with cooperating pairs in period 1; and then, in period 2, four out of the six 
defecting pairs raised contributions to a level higher than 20 points in our study. In addition, out 
                                                          
40
 See RESULT 3 and footnote 7 for potential causes of the difference in the initial cooperation rate between ours 
and Kagel and McGee (forthcoming). 
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of the pairs who chose “cooperate” but encountered ones who selected “defect” in period 1, four 
kept contributing more than 20 points (two contributed less than or equal to 20 points) in the 
following period. Accordingly, the number of those who contributed more than 20 points is 
constantly either 12 or 13 from period 2 through periods 13 in the experiment. (For example, the 
numbers of cooperating pairs are 13, 12, 13 and 13 in periods 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.)  
V. Conclusions 
 This paper experimentally compared cooperation behavior in a finitely-repeated dilemma 
situation between pairs and individuals under two matching protocols – partner matching of two 
pairs and stranger matching in a community. The individuals in the pairs are informed of who 
their pair partners are. Our results show that regardless of the matching protocols, pairs on 
average contribute significantly more than individuals do, as is consistent with Cason and Mui 
(1997). The power of joint decision-making is especially strong under the partner matching 
protocol. Almost all pairs successfully establish long-lasting, cooperative relationships with their 
matched pairs over the periods in the J-P treatment. By contrast, individuals in the I-P treatments 
fail to build such relationships and continue to decrease their contributions to their group 
accounts over the periods. The data taken from our elicitation task shows that subjects in the 
joint-decision treatments have significantly higher willingness to contribute even before 
communicating with their partners, compared against the subjects in the individual-decision 
treatments. The data also shows a possibility of group polarization. Those who initially prefer to 
contribute smaller amounts than their pair partners raise their willingness to contribute 
significantly after communicating with the partners, which lifts the pair contribution amounts 
above the pairs’ mean pre-communication hypothetical contribution amounts especially in the J-
P treatment. Finally, we also find that pairs reciprocate their matched pairs’ intentions to 
cooperate significantly more strongly than individuals in the corresponding individual-decision 
treatments. 
 People often make a single decision jointly with another person whose identity they know 
as a pair in our real life. Our study shows a possibility that such a joint decision-making process 
may help people overcome dilemmas and achieve mutual cooperative relationships with others. 
Nevertheless, there are many future research possibilities. For instance, what happens if more 
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than two persons, instead of a two-person pair, make a single decision in repeated dilemmas or 
they play different games, such as non-linear public goods games? What happens if social 
distance across pairs is also close unlike our study? More investigations to compare cooperation 
behaviors between individuals and teams with different experimental parameters or in more 
complex environments are also desired.  
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TABLE 1: Summary of Treatments 
 
         
Treatment 
name 
Decision Number of 
subjects per 
session 
Number of 
decision-making 
units in a group 
Prob. of  
meeting with a 
specific counterpart 
(pair, individual) in 
a period 
Endowment Per-point return  
from private acc’t 
Per-point return  
from group acc’t 
Avg. 
Contribution
#1
 
         
         
I. Treatments with Partner Matching Protocol     
J-P Joint 16 2 pairs  
(4 persons) 
100% 40 per  
pair 
1 per pair  
(0.5 per person) 
 
0.8 per pair 
(0.4 per person) 
30.8 
(77.1%) 
I-P Individual 8 2 persons 100% 40 per 
person 
0.5 per person 0.4 per person 14.8 
(36.9%) 
II. Treatments with Stranger Matching Protocol     
J-S Joint 16 2 pairs  
(4 persons) 
14.3%  
(1/7×100%) 
40 per  
pair 
1 per pair  
(0.5 per person) 
0.8 per pair 
(0.4 per person) 
21.3 
(53.2%) 
I-S Individual 8 2 persons 14.3% 
(1/7×100%) 
40 per 
person 
0.5 per person 0.4 per person 12.5 
(31.3%) 
         
 
Notes: We also conducted two additional treatments (named the “I-P-Punishment” treatment and the “I-S-Punishment” treatment) in order to compare the 
efficiency of the joint-decision system in the J-P and J-S treatments to that of an informal sanctioning institution. See Section 4.D for the description. 
#1 
The numbers in parenthesis are the average contributions as percentages of the endowment.
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FIGURE 1: Trends of Average Contributions 
 
  
 (a) Partner Treatments  (b) Stranger Treatments 
 
Notes: The dash lines indicate the average hypothetical contribution amounts elicited before communicating with their partners in the joint-decision treatments. 
Appendix TABLE B.1 reports period-by-period Mann-Whitney test results for the differences in the average contribution across the treatments.  
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TABLE 2: The Effects of Joint Decision-Making on Enhancing Contributions  
 
Dependent variable: The contribution amount of subject i in period t. 
 
     
Independent Variable Partner Treatments:  
J-P treatment  
versus I-P treatment 
Stranger Treatments: 
J-S treatment 
 versus I-S treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) Joint Decision-Making Dummy  
{= 1 for the J-P and J-S 
treatment; 0 otherwise} 
49.2*** 
(12.7) 
29.7** 
(13.7) 
18.8** 
(8.55) 
34.5*** 
(9.49) 
     
(ii) Period {= 1, 2, …, 15} --- -2.85*** --- -1.55*** 
  (.53)  (.34) 
     
(iii)Variable (i) × Variable (ii) --- 2.37*** --- -2.07*** 
  (.76)  (.51) 
     
Constant 5.51 27.4 4.51 17.7*** 
 (8.73) (9.40) (6.05) (6.55) 
     
# of Observations 480 480 480 480 
Log likelihood -847.6 -830.9 -1200.1 -1145.0 
Wald Chi-squared 14.92 41.76 4.82 105.4 
Prob > Wald Chi-squared .0001 .0000 .0282 .0000 
     
Chi-squared test (two-sided)  
for H0: (ii) + (iii) = 0 
 
   
Chi-squared --- 0.75 --- 84.57 
Prob > Chi-squared --- .3866 --- .0000*** 
     
 
Notes: Random effects Tobit regressions. The number of left(right)-censored observations is 142(205) in columns 
(1) and (2). The number of left(right)-censored observations is 159(108) in columns (3) and (4).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 3: Shifts in Contribution Amounts after Communication 
 
Dependent variable: The contribution amount subject i submitted after the communication 
stage minus the pre-communication hypothetical contribution amount by subject i in period t. 
 
     
Independent Variable J-P treatment J-S treatment 
 Self- 
regarding pairs 
(1) 
Other-
regarding pairs 
(2) 
Self- 
regarding pairs 
(3) 
Other- 
regarding pairs 
(4) 
     
     
(a) The positive deviation of hypothetical 
contributions in period t  
{= 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜, 0}} 
.51* 
(.18) 
.74*** 
(.063) 
.30*** 
(.11) 
.52** 
(.23) 
     
(b) The negative deviation of 
hypothetical contributions in period t  
{= 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑟,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜, 0}} 
.32 
(.14) 
.15*** 
(.025) 
.70*** 
(.12) 
.20* 
(.12) 
     
Constant 2.49 -.12 .38** -.78 
 (2.43) (.29) (.16) (.58) 
     
# of Observations 180 300 240 240 
R-squared .5035 .4902 .3044 .2444 
     
Two-sided F (Wald chi-squared) test  
for (a) = (b) 
    
F (Wald chi-squared) .34 126.29 3.25 .90 
Prob > F (Wald chi-squared) .5989 .0000*** .0714* .3440 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions. A Hausman specification test did not reject the null hypothesis that individual effects 
were appropriately modeled by random effects for each of columns (2) to (4) while it rejected the null for column 
(1). Considering the specification test results, we included fixed effects in columns (1) and random effects in 
columns (2), (3) and (4). Standard errors were clustered by group level in columns (1) and (2) and by session level in 
columns (3) and (4).  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE 4: Conditional Contribution Behavior by the Matching Protocol 
 
Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable: The contribution amount of pair (individual) i in period t ∈ {2, 3, …, 15}. 
 
     
 Partner Treatments: 
J-P treatment  
versus I-P treatments 
Stranger Treatments: 
J-S treatment 
versus I-S treatments 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(i) The contribution amount by the 
period t – 1 counterpart of pair 
(individual) i  
.92*** 
(.17) 
.70*** 
(.18) 
.54*** 
(.089) 
.37*** 
(.12) 
     
Variable (i) × Joint Decision-
Making Dummy {= 1 for the J-P 
and J-S treatments; 0 otherwise} 
---- 
.65** 
(.26) 
---- 
.32* 
(.17) 
     
Constant 7.42 2.76 3.38 2.93 
 (7.28) (6.74) (4.51) (4.35) 
     
# of Observations 448 448 448 448 
Log likelihood -743.0 -740.1 -1098.6 -1096.8 
Wald Chi-squared 31.11 37.63 36.13 39.39 
Prob > Wald Chi-squared .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
     
 
Notes: Random effects Tobit regressions. The number of left(right)-censored observations is 139(190) in columns 
(1) and (2), and 155(96) in columns (3) and (4). 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Appendix A: Instructions in the J-P treatment 
The following are instructions for the J-P treatment. 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed for your 
participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. 
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, points 
will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
1 point = 3.6 cents 
(This means that around 27.8 points will be exchanged for 1 dollar of real money).  At the end of the 
experiment your total earnings (including the $5 for participation) will be paid out to you in cash. 
During the entire experiment, you are paired with a participant next to you. Your pair and another 
randomly assigned pair form a group. This means that you are in a group with 3 other participants. You 
will be part of the same group throughout the entire experiment. No one knows which other pair 
(other 2 participants) is in their group, and no one will be informed which other pair was in which group 
after the experiment. 
This experiment has 15 periods. In each period, each pair will be given an endowment of 40 points and 
will make an allocation decision based on the endowment. We will first explain the nature of the 
interactions and will then describe how you make decision as a pair. 
Your decision as a pair: 
Each pair simultaneously decides how to use the endowment every period. There are 2 possibilities: 
1. You, as a pair, can allocate points to a group account. 
2. You, as a pair, can allocate points to a private account. 
For this purpose, each pair will be asked to indicate the number of points they want to allocate to the 
group account. The remaining points (40 minus their allocation to the group account) will be 
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automatically allocated to their private account. The earnings of your pair depend on the total number of 
points in the group account and the number of points in your pair’s private account. 
How to calculate your earnings: 
The earnings of your pair from the private account are equal to the number of points your pair allocates to 
the private account. That is, for each point your pair allocates to the private account your pair 
obtains 1 point as earnings. For example, the earnings of your pair from the private account equal 3 
points if it allocates 3 points to it. The points your pair allocates to your private account do not affect the 
earnings of the other pair.  
The earnings of your pair from the group account equal the sum of points allocated to the group account 
by your pair and the other pair multiplied by 0.8. That is, for each point your pair allocates to the 
group account, your pair and the other pair each get 0.8 points as earnings. For example, if the sum 
of points in the group account is 20, then your earnings from the group account and the earnings of the 
other pair each equal to 16 (= 20  .8) points.  
In summary, your pair’s earnings can be calculated with the following formula: 
40 – (points your pair allocates to the group account) + 0.8 * (sum of points allocated by your pair 
and the other pair to the group account)    
You and your partner in your pair each obtain half of the earnings that your pair obtains in this period. 
Note that your pair receives 1 point as earnings for each point your pair allocates to the private account. If 
your pair instead allocates 1 extra point to the group account, the earnings of your pair from the group 
account increase by 0.8 * 1 = 0.8 points; and your pair’s earnings from the private account decrease by 1 
point. However, by allocating 1 extra point to the group account, the earnings of the other pair also 
increase by 0.8 points. Therefore, the total group earnings increase by 0.8 * 2 = 1.6 points. Note that your 
pair also obtains earnings from points allocated to the group account by the other pair in your group. You 
obtain 0.8 * 1 = 0.8 points for each point allocated to the group account by the other pair. 
Example: 
Suppose your pair allocates 15 points to the group account, and the other pair in your group allocates 20 
points to it. In this case, the sum of points in the group account is 15 + 20 = 35 points. Therefore, each 
pair obtains earnings of 0.8 * 35 = 28.0 points from the group account.   
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The earnings of your pair in this case are: 40 – 15 + (28.0) = 53.0 points. You and your partner each 
obtain 53/2 = 26.5 points. 
The other pair’s earnings are: 40 – 20 + (28.0) = 48.0 points. Thus, each person in this pair obtains 48/2 = 
24 points. 
At the end of each period, you are informed of (1) the outcome of the allocation decisions along with (2) 
the information concerning the other pair’s joint allocation amount. 
How to decide allocation amounts in your pair: 
At the beginning of each period, you and your partner in your pair have 1 minute to communicate using 
the computer to jointly decide the allocation amount for the period. Specifically, you can send any 
messages via a chat window as illustrated below. Although your partner sits next to you, you are not 
allowed to communicate during the entire experiment except this communication stage (via the computer 
screen). 
An example of the computer screen: 
 
In the communication stage, any kind of offensive language is prohibited. With a clear violation of this 
rule you will be deducted 10 dollars from your today’s payment. Once the communication stage is over, 
you and your partner each submit your agreed joint allocation decision on your computer screen. In case 
that you do not agree what you allocate as a pair, you can submit whatever amount you prefer to allocate 
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as a pair to your group account. If both you and your partner submit the same (agreed) amount, then the 
amount becomes your pair’s joint allocation decision in this period. If you and your partner submit 
different amounts, then one of the two is randomly selected by the computer as your pair’s joint allocation 
decision. Once both of you press the “OK” button to submit your pair’s allocation decision, you will be 
informed of what allocation amount your partner submitted before you are informed of the outcome of the 
allocation stage in the period.  
Summary: 
At the onset of the experiment, you are paired with a person next to you. Your pair is randomly matched 
with another pair (2 individuals), forming a group of 4 individuals. The group assignment and your 
pairing do not change during the entire experiment; and you will play the following interactions 15 times 
with the 3 other participants. In each period, 
(1) you and your partner in your pair communicate using a chat window to discuss how to allocate as a 
pair (you have one minute for this purpose); 
(2) you and your partner in your pair each submit preferred (agreed) allocation amount of your pair. If 
you and your partner submit the same allocation amount, then the amount becomes your pair’s joint 
allocation decision. If the allocation amount you submit is different from that your partner submits, then 
one of the two submitted allocation amounts is randomly selected by the computer. Once you and your 
partner submit your pair’s allocation decision, you and your partner will be informed of what each of you 
submitted as your pair’s joint decision. 
(3) you will be informed of your pair’s earnings in the period, along with the allocation decision of the 
other pair in your group. The earnings of your pair are dependent on (b) the number of points in your 
pair’s private account and (b) the total allocation amounts to the group account by your pair and the other 
pair in your group. Your earnings in the present period are half of your pair’s total earnings. See the 
equation on page 2 for how your pair’s total earnings are calculated. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid based on your accumulated earnings.  
You may also be asked to answer some additional questions related to the experiment. 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  Once all questions have been answered, the experiment 
will begin. 
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Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please raise your 
hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. Suppose that each of the 2 pairs in your group allocates 0 points to the group account. 
 
a) How much does your pair earn? ___________________ 
 
b) How much do you earn? ___________________ 
 
c) How much does the other pair earn? ___________________ 
 
d) How much does each member in the other pair earn? ___________________ 
 
2. Suppose that each of the 2 pairs in your group allocates 20 points to the group account. 
 
a) How much does your pair earn? ___________________ 
 
b) How much do you earn? ___________________ 
 
c) How much does the other pair earn? ___________________ 
 
d) How much does each member in the other pair earn? ___________________ 
 
3. Suppose that the other pair in your group allocates 20 points to the group account. 
 
a) How much does your pair earn if your pair allocates 0 points to the group account? ______________  
In this case, how much do you earn? ______________ 
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b) How much does your pair earn if your pair allocates 20 points to the group account? ______________  
In this case, how much do you earn? _____________ 
 
c) How much does your pair earn if your pair allocates 40 points to the group account? ______________  
In this case, how much do you earn?  _____________ 
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Appendix B: Additional Tables 
TABLE B.1: Period-by-period Average Contribution by Treatment 
 
(1) Partner Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Period  
1 
Period  
2 
Period  
3 
Period  
4 
Period  
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
Period 
13 
Period 
14 
Period 
15 
                
I. Avg. Contribution              
a. I-P 25.9 24.7 17.8 15.3 13.7 13.1 13.9 16.1 12.7 11.7 11.3 13.1 13.8 10.9 7.4 
b. J-P 28.8 30.3 32.2 32.1 31.9 32.2 32.1 31.9 32.4 33.7 33.8 32.5 32.5 28.8 17.5 
II. Avg. Hypothetical Contribution Elicited Before the Communication Stage      
c. J-P 28.2 33.3 32.3 30.9 29.9 27.9 28.8 29.8 28.3 29.2 30.2 28.9 28.8 25.0 20.0 
III. Mann-Whitney Tests
#1 
           
H0: a = b                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.603 .245 .020** .017** .022** .027** .039** .045** .015** .019** .014** .031** .031** .049** .226 
                
H0: a = c                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.785 .091* .008*** .023** .030** .042** .061* .069* .048** .032** .021** .076* .053* .125 .105 
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(2) Stranger Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Period  
1 
Period  
2 
Period  
3 
Period  
4 
Period  
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
Period 
13 
Period 
14 
Period 
15 
                
I. Avg. Contribution              
a. I-S 17.5 18.1 16.1 16.3 15.0 11.6 11.6 12.8 13.6 12.3 14.0 11.4 5.3 6.5 5.9 
b. J-S 30.9 30.0 28.4 25.3 26.9 23.8 25.4 25.9 22.6 22.0 15.9 17.1 10.0 6.8 8.2 
II. Avg. Hypothetical Contribution Elicited Before the Communication Stage       
c. J-S 27.2 30.4 29.9 27.5 26.5 25.6 26.1 25.2 22.1 23.3 15.8 16.6 11.9 5.5 6.8 
III. Mann-Whitney Tests
#1 
           
H0: a = b                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.008*** .020** .073* .154 .063* .081* .030** .035** .225 .140 .958 .751 1.000 .915 .825 
H0: a = c                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.044** .018** .045** .066* .045** .027** .031** .074* .188 .114 .916 .244 .205 .709 .913 
                
 
 
Notes: Regression results measuring the average treatment effects of joint decision-making are found in TABLE 2 of the manuscript. 
#1 
16 average pair 
contributions in the J-P (J-S) treatment and 16 individual contributions in the I-P (I-S) treatment were compared for period 1. As for periods 2 to 15, average 
group contributions were used for the tests as the individuals’ or pairs’ contribution decisions could be correlated within groups. The Mann-Whitney tests results 
in periods 2 to 15 for the stranger treatments (Panel (2)) can only be used as suggestive evidence because the subjects’ decisions could be correlated within 
sessions.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE B.2: Tests of the PAT and SCT in the Joint-Decision Treatments 
 
   
 J-P treatment J-S treatment 
 Self-regarding 
pairs
 
Other regarding 
pairs 
Self-regarding 
pairs 
Other regarding 
pairs 
     
The number of pairs 6 10 8 8 
Average hypothetical 
contribution across all 
periods 
15.9 36.5 15.0 27.7 
Shifts after communication
#1
    
(a) The # of cases where  
𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑘,𝑡 > 
1
2
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜2
𝑖=1  
(other-regarding shift)
#2
 
32 21 17 34 
(b) The # of cases where  
𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑘,𝑡 = 
1
2
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜2
𝑖=1
#2
 
40 117 78 57 
(c) The # of cases where  
𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑘,𝑡 < 
1
2
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜2
𝑖=1  
(self-regarding shift)
#2
 
18 12 25 29 
Average per-period shift 
from their hypothetical 
contribution amount
#3
 
3.31 1.31 -.21 .083 
     
 
Notes: We treat a pair as a self-regarding pair if the pair’s average hypothetical contribution across all periods is less 
than the average hypothetical contribution in the session. We treat a pair as an other-regarding pair if the pair’s 
average hypothetical contribution across all periods is greater than the average of hypothetical contributionss in the 
session. See Section III of the manuscript. 
#1
 Each subject made 15 decisions in the experiment. Thus, the sums of 
cases (a), (b) and (c) are 15 times the numbers of pairs in the corresponding columns. 
#2 
The right hand sides of the 
equations are the averages of pair k’s two members’ pre-communication hypothetical contributions in period t. The 
left hand sides of the equations are pair k’s joint contribution in period t. #3 Each number in this row equals the 
average of 
1
15∙𝐾
∑ ∑ [𝐶𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑘,𝑡 −
1
2
∑ 𝐶𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜2
𝑖=1 ]
15
𝑡=1𝑘 , where K is the number of pairs in the corresponding column 
(which is 6, 10 or 8).   
 
Remark: See TABLE 3 of the manuscript regarding how each person was affected by her partner 
within their pair.  
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Appendix C: Additional Data for the Subjects’ Reasoning 
All subjects were asked to answer the following open-ended question: “On what basis did you make 
allocation decisions?” They answered privately using their computer terminals (The following comments 
are exactly what they wrote. We did not edit their responses. Each comment is by different subject.) 
1. Partner Treatments 
[J-P Treatment:] 
“Whatever would maximize my points” 
“Conversation with my partner.” 
“Maximum outcome” 
“maximal payoff” 
“Tried to get all point in group until last 2 rounds” 
“I made allocation decisions based on what was best for the entire group until round 14 when I thought 
that allocating 0 was the best decision because they might try to play a trick on us and not allocate 
anything to the group.” 
“What could get me and my partner the maximum payout.” 
“earning the most money for my partner and i” 
“I gave the other pair a chance to work together and they accepted so we just kept giving 40 to the group 
account and it was mutually beneficial.” 
“The main driver behind my allocation decision was maintaining cooperation between our group and the 
group with which we were paired. Although we could have made more profits by allocating less money to 
the group account, and thus being less cooperative, this would have led to a breakdown of our cooperative 
relationship and made the outcomes of each period completely unpredictable, which i believe would have 
led to less profits in the long run.” 
“Trying to get the most number of points in the end of the experiment as possible.” 
“I feel pretty generous, but I was weary at first. After the fourth round I was comfortable with putting in 
all the points” 
“if both groupgs contribute 40, we will each get the most points” 
“What I expected others to do. eventually felt failed by the people in the room bidding 0.” 
“We made decisions through group compromise and through what we thought the other group was going 
to do.” 
“greatest possible earnings” 
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“I decided to earn as many points as possible; even though I know the fact that the other pair will earn 
much.” 
“Getting max points for both pairs” 
“random chance” 
“We made decisions based on what the other groups did in the past. Initially I wanted to put 40 in the 
group and hoped that the other group would too so we could both make the most money. But that didn't 
happen, so we had to be conservative to avoid making less than 20 points. Which was disappointing 
because we both could have been better off.” 
“My partner and I both decide together.” 
“At first, I put in a small amount and waited to see what the other pair put before making future decisions. 
Since they put in 40, I increased the number of points I put in to 40 for the next two times, but they started 
putting 0 every time. After that, I mostly just put 0 every time because the other pair was not contributing 
to the group account.” 
“Mathematically. Group outcome was higher if we all pooled in, and assumption that they would be smart 
enough to do the same.” 
“I wanted to make the most amount of money.” 
“Best outcome for the group leading to a larger expected outcome for everyone” 
“We wanted stability between my pair and the other pair....largest group fund seemed like the best 
decision.  Yes, American dollars with the group fund took a hit of 0.8 compared to personal points 
keeping their actual value but in the end, group account being highest seemed the best” 
“I agreed early with my partner that we want the other pair to continue allocate high amounts between 30 
and 40, so we allocate 35-40 points.” 
“We first started with establishing a sense of trust, so the other team bid higher throughout the 15-round 
period.  We knew that since we weren't randomly assigned, this would be key. so, we bid high, and 
continued to bid high once the other team did the same (they caught onto our plan quickly).” 
“Well the first round was mainly to get a better idea of what the group was thinking, so we only gave 20. 
But then once we say that they did 40, we immediately decided to do the same.” 
“based on the other pair's decision. if they are not selfish and contribute to the group account, I'd do the 
same too.” 
“Based on my partners, and other pair's previouse decisions.” 
“building trust, mirroring their actions, worried about last round good faith or psychopath leveraging” 
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[I-P treatment:] 
“basis on the result” 
“I accepted 20 points per round gladly and put all of my points into my private account and let my 
counterpart put money into the group account for me.” 
“After completing the worksheet, I had a better understanding of how much I would earn depending on 
different allocations. I started using one of the higher risk, more beneficial strategies and allocated half of 
my points to the group. However, when I saw that others weren't reciprocating, I changed my allocations 
to 0.” 
“Initially tried to allocate all of my points into group account, but when partner did not cooperate after ~5 
rounds, I decided to allocate all my points to my private account” 
“wanted to see what the other person decided and then attempted to match it” 
“In the beginning, I wanted to allocated as many points to the group account for a mutual benefit” 
“I tried to contribute to the group fund originally, but my partner wasn't contributing anything so I 
maximized my benefit by keeping all of my points” 
“My intution” 
“I based my decisions partly on my partner's decisions and the fact that I would get more points if my 
partner and I both allocated to the group account, but more points individually if i allocated all to my 
private account” 
“On first it was kind of random, but towards the end there was a range that the allocations fell to and I just 
followed along with that.” 
“what numbers that I tried produced the most amount of total earnings and I repeated those numbers” 
“I made full allocations to group pool for first three rounds, when it became apparent that my partner was 
unwilling to do the same I withrew my allocations to the group pool on principal.” 
“Solve the optimization problem - balance individual earnings with group earnings” 
“what would maximize my earnings” 
“Based on my trust that the other person would allocate all resources to group account.” 
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2. Stranger Treatments 
[J-S Treatment:] 
“Started off near the midpoint and adjusted from there based on how the rounds were going” 
“partner” 
“If both pairs gave 40 points to the group, each individual would maximize their total points.” 
“We picked 40 and went with it” 
“To generate the greatest level of earnings” 
“40 was a mutual benefit to the most people and thus the best choice” 
“The most is to be gained if everyone gives all, so we gave all.” 
“Share the profits to start in order to gain trust, and then take it all when either everyone is trusting or 
everyone is doing the same thing you are.” 
“previous interactions” 
“jesus” 
“$$$” 
“at first trying to get people to play towards getting the best outcomes for both pairs. then once groups 
seemed to be playing for the good of the team, took advantage towards last few rounds to try to maximize 
our pair's gains.” 
“discuss with pair partner” 
“Came to agreement with partner.” 
“PLAYING IT SAFE” 
“Logic? It was the best decision to hold on to as many points as possibe” 
“After pairing up with the first couple of teams, we noticed not many people were pushing for 40 in fear 
of losing points. So, we chose a decision lower every time.” 
“I wanted to balance out making the most with giving some up to keep everyone from "going negative" 
very early on. I guess just undercut people a tiny bit while keeping overall contributions high.” 
“Tried to comply with my paartner” 
“luck” 
“Me and my partner both started out with 15 so we agreed to put in 15 majority of the time.” 
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“based on what I thought others would do” 
“tested the highs and lows, then decided it was more interesting to choose at random” 
“Whatever my partner and I felt like doing is what we did. We agreed on basiclaly every round, until 
finally we decided to both enter random #s and let the computer choose!” 
“Upon discussing with my partner and then get our compromise and also evaluating from the previous 
rounds.” 
“I wanted to try to get as close to a dollar earning each round without risking too much.” 
“My partner and I based our decisions on what the general trend of the group was.” 
“Based on pprevious rounds and the opinions of my partner” 
“discussion with partner” 
“I wanted to spread a generosity ethos.” 
[I-S treatment:] 
“my earnings” 
“At first I allocated 40 to the group account, but people were not allocating much to the group, so I started 
allocating 0 to the group and 40 to private account.” 
“Began with the best thing for both of us (allocating most or all), when I saw they weren't doing the same 
I moved to allocating nothing” 
“I knew to get the optimal amount of points, both people would have to allocate 40 points to make it 80, 
which would give both os uf 32 points.” 
“Figuring out what would be the maximum for both persons” 
“depending on previous round decisions” 
“Based on previous results” 
“I picked 0 every time.” 
“Based on former decision of my partner” 
“To make the most money” 
“I tried to see how the numbers were changing and tried to put values that wuld give me the biggest 
number.” 
“I went in a pattern. So I started at 20 and then went down in increments of 5 to zero and once I reached 
zero I started from 20 again but instead went up in increments of 5. I repeated this process until the 
experiment was finished.” 
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“I wanted to maximize my points by putting 20 points in the group account expecting that the other 
person would also put 20 points. But when after a few rounds the other person started allocating 0 points I 
started allocating 0 points to te group account to assure myself at least 20 points in each round. I knew 
that both can get 32 points by putting 40 each in the group account but no one was really doing that so i 
stuck to putting 0 points to the group account” 
“random and feeling” 
“because the experiment was anonymous, there were no negative reprocussions for putting in 0 just about 
every time, whatever anybody else put into the group was simply my gain” 
“Whether or not my last earning were high or low, if I should allocate more or less tot eh group account.” 
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Appendix D: The Additional Treatments – Instructions for the I-P-Punishment treatment     
The following are instructions for the I-P-Punishment treatment.
1
 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the decisions 
of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed for your 
participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
During the experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. 
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, points 
will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
1 point = 3.6 cents 
(This means that around 27.8 points will be exchanged for 1 dollar of real money).  At the end of the 
experiment your total earnings (including the $5 for participation) will be paid out to you in cash. 
In the experiment, all participants are randomly divided into groups of 2 individuals. This means that 
you are in a group with another participant. You will be part of the same group throughout the entire 
experiment. No one knows which participant is in their group, and no one will be informed who was in 
which group after the experiment.  
This experiment has 15 periods. In each period, each group member, yourself included, will be given an 
endowment of 40 points. You will then make an allocation decision based on the endowment and 
reduction decision.  
Your first decision: 
You and your counterpart simultaneously decide how to use the endowment. There are 2 possibilities: 
1. You can allocate points to a group account. 
2. You can allocate points to a private account. 
For this purpose, you will be asked to indicate the number of points you want to allocate to the group 
account. The remaining points (40 minus your allocation to the group account) will be automatically 
                                                          
2
1Instructions of the I-S-Punishment treatment are available from the author upon request. 
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allocated to your private account. Your earnings depend on the total number of points in the group 
account and the number of points in your private account. 
How to calculate your earnings: 
Your earnings from your private account are equal to the number of points you allocate to the private 
account multiplied by 0.5. That is, for each point you allocate to the private account you get 0.5 points 
as earnings. For example, your earnings from your private account equal 2 points if you allocate 4 points 
to it. The points you allocate to your private account do not affect the earnings of your counterpart.  
Your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated to the group account by you and 
your counterpart multiplied by 0.4. That is, for each point you allocate to the group account you and 
your counterpart each obtain 0.4 points as earnings. For example, if the sum of points in the group 
account is 20, then your earnings from the group account and your counterpart’s earnings from the group 
account each equal to 8 (= 20  .4) points.  
Your earnings can be calculated with the following formula: 
0.5 * {40 – (points you allocate to the group account)} 
+ 0.4 * (sum of points allocated by you and your counterpart to the group account)    
Note that you get 0.5 points as earnings for each point you allocate to your private account. If you instead 
allocate 1 extra point to the group account, your earnings from the group account increase by 0.4 * 1 = 0.4 
points and your earnings from your private account decrease by 0.5 points. However, by allocating 1 extra 
point to the group account, the earnings of your counterpart also increase by 0.4 points. Therefore, the 
total group earnings increase by 0.4 * 2 = 0.8 points, which is greater than 0.5. Note that you also obtain 
earnings from points allocated to the group account by your counterpart. You obtain 0.4 * 1 = 0.4 points 
for each point allocated to the group account by your partner. 
Example: 
Suppose you allocate 15 points to the group account and your counterpart allocates 10 points to the group 
account. In this case, the sum of points in the group account is 15 + 10 = 25 points. Thus, each group 
member obtains earnings of 0.4 * 25 = 10.0 points from the group account.   
Your earnings are: 0.5 * {40 – 15} + (10.0) = 22.5 points. 
Your counterpart’s earnings are: 0.5 * {40 – 10} + (10.0) = 25.0 points. 
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Your earnings might be reduced by the decisions of your counterpart in the next stage explained below. 
Your second decisions: 
 Once everybody reviews the outcome of the allocation stage and clicks the “Continue” button, 
each member is given an opportunity to reduce their counterpart’s earnings at their cost. Your earnings 
decrease by 0.5 points for each reduction point you assign to your counterpart; but, by doing so, 1.5 
points will be deducted from the earnings of your counterpart. Your earnings could also be reduced 
by your counterpart. For each reduction point you receive from your counterpart, your earnings will 
decrease by 1.5 points. If you don’t want to reduce the earnings of your counterpart, you can assign 0 
reductions points to him or her. 
There are some restrictions for your reduction decisions in this stage. First, your reductions given to your 
counterpart cannot make their earnings in the present period less than zero. However, each member incurs 
the cost of giving reduction points to their partner. As a result, you may obtain negative earnings (see the 
formula of calculating your earnings below for details). If you receive negative earnings, these points will 
be deducted from your earnings in other periods. Second, your reduction points must be integers between 
0 and 20. After this stage, your earnings are calculated as: 
Part 1: Earnings from the allocation stage minus 1.5  reductions given by your counterpart, or 0 if it is 
negative  
    -- minus -- 
Part 2: 0.5 * Reduction points you assign to reduce the earnings of your counterpart 
 
Note that you incur the cost in Part 2 even if it causes your net earnings for the period to be negative. 
 
At the end of each period, you are informed of (a) the number of reduction points you received from your 
counterpart along with (b) your final earnings in the period.  
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid based on your accumulated earnings over the 15 periods.  
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.  Once all questions have been answered, the experiment 
will begin. 
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Comprehension questions: 
Please answer the following questions to check your understanding of the instructions. Please raise your 
hand if you have any questions.  
 
1. Suppose you and your counterpart allocate 0 points to the group account. 
 
a) How many points do you have after the allocation stage? ___________________ 
 
b) How many points does your counterpart have after the allocation stage?  ___________________ 
 
2. Suppose you and your counterpart allocate 20 points to the group account. 
 
a) How many points do you have after the allocation stage? ___________________ 
 
b) How many points does your counterpart have after the allocation stage?  ___________________ 
 
3. Suppose your counterpart allocates 20 points to the group account. 
 
a) How many points do you have after the allocation stage if you allocate 0 points to the group account? 
______________ 
  
b) How many points do you have after the allocation stage if you allocate 20 points to the group account? 
_____________ 
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c) How many points do you have after the allocation stage if you allocate 40 points to the group account? 
_____________ 
 
4. Answer the following questions.  
 
a) How much does it cost you if you assign 4 reduction points to your counterpart?                           d                            
d 
b) How many points are deducted from your counterpart’s earnings if you assign 4 reduction points to 
her?                           d 
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Appendix E: The Additional Treatments – Basic Data (The I-P-Punishment and I-S-Punishment treatments) 
TABLE E.1: Period-by-period Average Contributions 
 
(1) Partner Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Period  
1 
Period  
2 
Period  
3 
Period  
4 
Period  
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
Period 
13 
Period 
14 
Period 
15 
                
I. Avg. Contribution              
A. I-P 25.9 24.7 17.8 15.3 13.7 13.1 13.9 16.1 12.7 11.7 11.3 13.1 13.8 10.9 7.4 
B. J-P 28.8 30.3 32.2 32.1 31.9 32.2 32.1 31.9 32.4 33.7 33.8 32.5 32.5 28.8 17.5 
C. I-P-Pun 
-ishment 
27.2 31.9 34.7 30.8 29.0 30.6 34.1 33.7 33.3 33.4 31.9 32.8 31.7 31.7 30.6 
                
II. Mann-Whitney Tests
 
           
H0: A = C
#1
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.784 .1429 .0028*** .0256** .0628* .0247** .0103** .0146** .0183** .0067*** .0150** .0238** .0395** .0201** .0057*** 
                
H0: B = C
#2
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.7409 .5873 .6365 .8388 .9167 .5661 .9141 .6766 .9103 .9101 .6757 .8576 .8109 .7782 .0858* 
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(2) Stranger Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Period  
1 
Period  
2 
Period  
3 
Period  
4 
Period  
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
Period 
13 
Period 
14 
Period 
15 
                
I. Avg. Contribution              
A. I-S 17.5 18.1 16.1 16.3 15.0 11.6 11.6 12.8 13.6 12.3 14.0 11.4 5.3 6.5 5.9 
B. J-S 30.9 30.0 28.4 25.3 26.9 23.8 25.4 25.9 22.6 22.0 15.9 17.1 10.0 6.8 8.2 
C. I-S-Pun 
-ishment 
20.1 20.0 19.2 18.7 20.8 19.6 20.3 23.3 21.4 24.6 23.4 20.9 25.4 23.9 19.1 
            
II. Mann-Whitney Tests
 
           
H0: A = C
#1
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.515 .8323 .3417 .4913 .3041 .0352** .0449** .0655* .1138 .0307** .0922* .0345** .0009*** .0015*** .0232** 
H0: B = C
#2
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.0158** .0558* .0288** .2194 .3019 .4349 .3263 .5966 .8441 .6778 .2527 .5885 .0121** .0013** .0560* 
                
 
Notes: 
#1
 Individual contributions were compared between the I-P (I-S) and I-P-Punishment (I-S-Punishment) treatments for period 1. As for periods 2 to 15, 
group-level average contributions were compared between the two treatments. 
#2
 Pair average contributions in the J-P (J-S) treatment and individual contributions 
in the I-P-Punishment (I-S-Punishment) treatment were compared for period 1. Group-level average contributions were compared between the two treatments as 
for periods 2 to 15. The Mann-Whitney tests results in periods 2 to 15 for the stranger treatments (Panel (2)) can only be used as suggestive evidence because the 
subjects’ decisions could be correlated within sessions. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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TABLE E.2: Period-by-period Average Payoffs 
 
(1) Partner Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Period  
1 
Period  
2 
Period  
3 
Period  
4 
Period  
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
Period 
13 
Period 
14 
Period 
15 
                
I. Avg. Contribution              
A. I-P 27.8 27.4 25.3 24.6 24.1 23.9 24.2 24.8 23.8 23.5 23.4 23.9 24.1 23.3 22.2 
B. J-P 28.6 29.1 29.7 29.6 29.6 29.7 29.6 29.6 29.7 30.1 30.1 29.8 29.8 28.6 25.3 
C. I-P-Pun 
-ishment 
28.1 29.6 30.4 29.2 28.7 29.2 30.2 30.1 30.0 30.1 29.6 29.8 29.5 29.5 27.5 
            
II. Mann-Whitney Tests
 
           
H0: A = C
#1
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.945 .1429 .0028*** .0256** .0628* .0247** .0103** .0146** .0183** .0067*** .0150** .0238** .0395** .0201** .0108** 
                
H0: B = C
#2
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.7536 .5873 .6365 .8388 .9167 .5661 .9141 .6766 .9103 .9101 .6757 .8576 .8109 .7782 .1188 
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(2) Stranger Treatments 
 
Treatment 
name 
Period  
1 
Period  
2 
Period  
3 
Period  
4 
Period  
5 
Period 
6 
Period 
7 
Period 
8 
Period 
9 
Period 
10 
Period 
11 
Period 
12 
Period 
13 
Period 
14 
Period 
15 
                
I. Avg. Contribution              
A. I-S 25.3 25.4 24.8 24.9 24.5 23.5 23.5 23.8 24.1 23.7 24.2 23.4 21.6 22.0 21.8 
B. J-S 29.3 29.0 28.5 27.6 28.1 27.1 27.6 27.8 26.8 26.6 24.8 25.1 23.0 22.0 22.5 
C. I-S-Pun 
-ishment 
23.9 25.1 22.9 24.4 24.1 23.6 25.5 26.0 24.4 25.6 22.9 23.9 27.1 26.6 21.4 
            
II. Mann-Whitney Tests
 
           
H0: A = C
#1
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.494 .5982 .6728 .9578 .8715 .7520 .1394 .1553 .7518 .2691 .7926 .1706 .0016*** .0061*** .6330 
H0: B = C
#2
                
p-value 
(2-sided) 
.0321** .0346** .0200** .0917* .1843 .1709 .2926 .3424 .5280 .6337 .9162 .9580 .0353** .0061** .7087 
                
 
Notes: 
#1
 Individual contributions were compared between the I-P (I-S) and I-P-Punishment (I-S-Punishment) treatments for period 1. As for periods 2 to 15, 
group-level average contributions were compared between the two treatments. 
#2
 Pair average contributions in the J-P (J-S) treatment and individual contributions 
in the I-P-Punishment (I-S-Punishment) treatment were compared for period 1. Group-level average contributions were compared between the two treatments as 
for periods 2 to 15. The Mann-Whitney tests results in periods 2 to 15 for the stranger treatments (Panel (2)) can only be used as suggestive evidence because the 
subjects’ decisions could be correlated within sessions. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
